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Summary: On August 13, 2009, the Payment Cards Center hosted a workshop examining the 
changing nature of data security in consumer electronic payments. The center invited the chairman and 
CEO of Heartland Payment Systems (HPS or Heartland), Robert (Bob) Carr, to lead this 
discussion and to share his experiences stemming from the data breach at his company in late 2008 
and, as important, to discuss lessons learned as a result of this event. The former director of the 
Payment Cards Center, Peter Burns, who is acting as a senior payments advisor to HPS, also joined 
the discussion to outline Heartland’s post-breach efforts aimed at improving information sharing and 
data security within the consumer payments industry. In conclusion, Carr introduced several technology 
solutions that are under discussion in payment security circles as ways to better secure payment card 
data as they move among the different parties in the card payment systems: end-to-end encryption, 
tokenization, and chip technology. While HPS has been very supportive of end-to-end encryption, each 
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I.  Introduction 
 
On August 13, 2009, the Payment Cards Center hosted a workshop examining the changing 
nature of data security in consumer electronic payments. The center invited the chairman and 
CEO of Heartland Payment Systems (Heartland), Robert (Bob) Carr, to lead this discussion and 
to share his experiences stemming from the data breach at his company in late 2008  and, as 
important, to discuss lessons learned as a result of this event. The former director of the Payment 
Cards Center, Peter Burns, who is acting as a senior payments advisor to Heartland, also joined 
the discussion to outline Heartland’s post-breach efforts aimed at improving information sharing 
and data security within the consumer payments industry. In conclusion, Carr introduced several 
technology solutions that are under discussion in payment security circles as ways to better secure 
payment card data as they move among the different parties in the card payment systems: end-to-
end encryption, tokenization, and chip technology. While Heartland has been very supportive of 
end-to-end encryption, each of these alternatives offers its own set of advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Heartland Payment Systems has built its business on the acquiring side of consumer payment 
systems. In a four-party system,
1 on one side are bankcard issuers and their customers who hold 
consumer payment cards. These cardholders use their credit, debit, and prepaid cards to make 
purchases at merchants. The term ―merchants‖ is broadly defined to include not only retail 
merchants but also any entity, such as a doctor’s office, that accepts card-based payments in 
exchange for goods or services. On the other side, merchant banks or, as is many times the case, 
their merchant acquiring or processing partners
2 process consumer card payments into payment 
                                                 
1 For more detail, see James M. Lyon, ―The Interchange Fee Debate: Issues and Economics,‖ The Region, 
June 2006, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
(www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3235) 
2 The roles played by merchant banks, merchant acquirers, and merchant processors are not always distinct. 
Merchant banks may act solely as a partner to merchant acquirers or merchant transaction processors for 
the purposes of sponsoring access to payment card networks. On the other hand, a merchant bank may also 
act as an acquirer or a processor. Merchant acquirers that are not also merchant banks may only acquire 2 
 
card networks on behalf of merchants.
3 For example, in its role as a merchant acquirer and 
processor, Heartland acts as the intermediary between the merchant point of sale (POS) and the 
banks’ card networks (Visa Inc., MasterCard Worldwide, American Express, and Discover 
Financial Services). Heartland receives and stores the payment information, including card details 
and purchase amount, from the merchant and sends it to the appropriate network in order to 
obtain payment authorizations, facilitate account reconciliation between merchants and bank card 
issuers, and manage the chargeback process.
4 
Heartland Payment Systems has been in the merchant acquiring and transaction processing 
business since 1997. It has built its merchant base from 2,500 clients, processing $0.4 billion in 
transactions, to over 250,000 clients, processing over $80 billion and 4.2 billion transactions 
annually.  According to The Nilson Report, Heartland is currently the fifth largest merchant 
acquirer in the United States ranked by number of general-purpose-card purchase transactions.
5  
Heartland has also expanded its processing services to include more than credit, debit, and 
prepaid card payments. Today, Heartland also processes payments related to payroll, Check 21, 
online payments, micropayments, and gift and loyalty programs. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
merchant processing contracts on behalf of merchant banks or merchant processors. Merchant acquirers 
may also be merchant processors and, therefore, acquire merchant processing contracts to expand their own 
processing business. Similarly, merchant processors may also be merchant acquirers, or, alternatively, they 
may perform only those duties associated with the processing of merchant transactions.  
3 In order to access the payment card authorization networks managed by Visa and MasterCard, a merchant 
processor either must be a bank and a member of the payment card network or must have a partnership with 
a bank sponsor to enable access to the card network. In Heartland’s case, it has partnered with bank 
sponsors to allow it direct access to the payment card networks.  
4 Merchant transaction processors perform a number of other account management functions for merchants, 
but this discussion focuses on the role these firms play in the movement of data among the four parties in 
the consumer card payment systems. For more information on the various activities performed by merchant 
acquirers and processors, see Ann Kjos, ―The Merchant-Acquiring Side of the Payment Card Industry: 
Structure, Operations, and Challenges,‖ Payment Cards Center, October 2007. 
(www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-
papers/2007/D2007OctoberMerchantAcquiring.pdf) 
5 The Nilson Report, Issue 922, March 2009, p. 1. 3 
 
II.  Heartland’s Data Breach: What Happened? 
The method used to compromise Heartland’s network was ultimately determined to be SQL 
injection. Code written eight years ago for a web form allowed access to Heartland’s corporate 
network. This code had a vulnerability that (1) was not identified through annual internal and 
external audits of Heartland’s systems or through continuous internal system-monitoring 
procedures, and (2) provided a means to extend the compromise from the corporate network to 
the separate payment processing network. Although the vulnerability existed for several years, 
SQL injection didn’t occur until late 2007.  
After compromising Heartland’s corporate network, the intruders spent almost six months 
and many hours hiding their activities while attempting to access the processing network, 
bypassing different anti-virus packages used by Heartland. After accessing the corporate network, 
the fraudsters installed sniffer software
6 that was able to capture payment card data, including 
card numbers, card expiration dates, and, in some cases, cardholder names
7 as the data moved 
within Heartland’s processing system.
8  
The fraudsters’ focus on compromising data as they moved within Heartland’s network – data 
in transit – rather than when they were stored in consumer databases —   or, in other words, when 
data were at rest — was a relatively new phenomenon as described by Carr. One example, if not 
the first, of this expansion in focus toward data-in-transit compromises was the data breach at 
                                                 
6 Sniffer software is defined as ―a hardware or software mechanism that monitors, and possibly records, 
data traffic on a network.‖ See the Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, 2005 edition.  
7 Thomas Claborn, ―Heartland Payment Systems Hit by Data Security Breach,‖ Information Week, January 
20, 2009. (www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=212901505)  
8 According to a Heartland press release, ―No merchant data or cardholder Social Security numbers, 
unencrypted personal identification numbers (PIN), addresses or telephone numbers were involved in the 
breach. Nor were any of Heartland's check management systems; Canadian, payroll, campus solutions or 
micropayments operations; Give Something Back Network; or the recently acquired Network Services and 
Chockstone processing platforms.‖ For more information see the press release, ―Heartland Payment 
Systems Uncovers Malicious Software in its Processing System,‖ Heartland Payment Systems, January 20, 
2009. (www.2008breach.com/Information20090120.asp) 4 
 
Hannaford Brothers announced in early 2008
9. In Carr’s opinion, the technique used in the 
Hannaford case is something that should have been well understood by the industry in a few 
weeks’ time. Instead, after the Hannaford breach, Carr emphasized that the same method of attack 
focused on stealing data in transit had been applied many times prior to Heartland’s breach.  
For Carr, this precedent raised a clear signal that quicker and more efficient methods of 
information sharing related to breach techniques were needed in order to limit fraud risks. He 
underscored the fact that knowledge of breach techniques should not be viewed as a competitive 
advantage among merchants or their processors. Rather, sharing this information is an important 
contribution to securing increasingly important consumer payments systems and increases the 
network value for all participants.  
In addition, Carr noted that Heartland was certified by network-approved quality security 
assessors (QSAs) as being PCI compliant at the time of the breach
10 and, in fact, had received this 
certification several times during the period in which the vulnerability had been present. He used 
this point not to diminish PCI but rather to emphasize that PCI compliance is a minimum standard 
and that most companies regularly do much more than required by PCI.  Heartland Payment 
Systems was one of those companies that had met its PCI requirements and had made data 
security one of its top, if not its top, business priorities. Carr said that Heartland manages data 
security 24/7 and has about 7 percent of its information technology staff focused on security 
efforts, including a recently hired senior executive who focuses solely on data security and 
                                                 
9 Clarke Canfield and Brian Bergstein, ―Hannaford Data Breach Offers Twists from Prior Attacks,‖ 
Associated Press, March 20, 2008. 
10 The Payments Cards Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council was founded in 2006 by five card 
networks — Visa, Inc., MasterCard Worldwide, Discover Financial Services, American Express, and JCB 
International.  Together these card brands equally share in the governance of the organization that is 
responsible for the development and management of PCI Data Security Standards (PCI DSS). PCI DSS is a 
set of security standards that all payment system participants, including merchants and processors, are 
required to meet in order to participate in card payment systems. To help validate that card payment system 
participants meet PCI DSS standards, the card brands have approved about 100 companies to be qualified 
security assessors (QSAs). QSAs perform security audits on firms that meet certain criteria to determine 
their compliance with PCI DSS. A list of these standards, the PCI DSS audit requirements, and more 




11 That a data breach occurred despite Heartland’s strong focus on data security and its 
status as being PCI compliant has led Carr to the opinion that more must be done to increase the 
security of data transfers (data in transit) among participants in the payments system, including 
merchants.
12   
To address his concerns regarding data sharing and payment network data security, Carr 
initiated two strategic objectives at Heartland in the wake of the breach: provide leadership (1) in 
creating a collaborative information-sharing capability and ( 2) in advancing technical solutions 
to secure data, in particular as they move among participants on the acquiring side of the 
payments system. Senior payments advisor Peter Burns led a discussion of these efforts described 
in the next section. 
 
III.  Heartland’s Response  
   As noted, Heartland’s response to its data breach rested on two pillars aimed at the 
merchant acquiring and processing side of the payment system: improve data sharing and better 
secure data, particularly data in transit. 
a.  Improve Information Sharing 
Burns observed that the merchant acquiring side of the payments network has always 
faced greater coordination challenges than the issuing side of the business.  Unlike bank card 
issuers, the acquiring side does not enjoy the range of information-sharing outlets sponsored by 
such bank-oriented organizations such as the American Bankers Association or BITs.  
Coordination problems have arisen on the merchant acquiring side for a variety of reasons, 
including a much more fragmented marketplace than on the card-issuing side. For example, in the 
                                                 
11 For employee information, see also Heartland’s 2008 10-K filing. 
12 For more information on data at rest and data in transit, see James C. McGrath and Ann Kjos, 
―Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information: Facing Up to the 
Challenges,‖ Payment Cards Center, September13-14, 2006, p. 7. (www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-
cards-center/events/conferences/2007/C2006SeptInfoSecuritySummary.pdf) 6 
 
U.S., there are over 7 million card-accepting merchants, while there are only about 6,000 credit 
card-issuing depository institutions.
13 Moreover, the merchant processing supply chain is more 
extended and complex  than on the card-issuing side, with roles played by merchants, merchant 
banks, merchant acquirers, third-party processors, independent sales organizations (ISOs), and a 
variety of additional third-party service providers.
14 
To overcome the coordination problems, Heartland, Burns noted, identified an already 
existing infrastructure that could be leveraged in support of its data-sharing initiative. This 
infrastructure, managed by the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-
ISAC),
15 allows for the dissemination of information about security threats to a broad 
membership that includes not only banks but a wide range of financial services providers. FS-
ISAC relies on a foundation of public-private partnerships to facilitate the gathering of 
information about a range of security threats and disseminating that information among law 
enforcement, government agencies, and FS-ISAC’s private-sector member companies. 
In partnership with the FS-ISAC, Heartland helped to establish the Payments Processing 
Information Sharing Council (PPISC) as a subgroup under the FS-ISAC umbrella.  Burns noted 
that, at this time, membership in PPISC is limited to bank-owned and third-party card payment 
                                                 
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, ―Credit Cards: Rising Interchange Fees Have Increased Costs 
for Merchants, but Options for Reducing Fees Pose Challenges,‖ Report to Congressional 
Addressees, November 2009, p. 6. 
14 For more information on the types of service providers that may participate in the merchant processing 
supply chain, including ISOs, see Ann Kjos, ―The Merchant-Acquiring Side of the Payment Card Industry: 
Structure, Operations, and Challenges,‖ Payment Cards Center, October 2007, p. 7-8. 
(www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-
papers/2007/D2007OctoberMerchantAcquiring.pdf) 
15 FS-ISAC was established as the result of a 1998 Clinton Presidential Directive (63) that was later 
updated by President Bush in 2003 under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. This directive 
mandated identification of infrastructures, which included the banking and finance industry, critical to the 
operation of the U.S. economy and the U.S. government. As these sectors became more reliant on 
information technology, more overlap existed with regard to system risks due to physical and cyber 
security threats. In recognition of this commonality, the directive aimed to better coordinate information-
sharing efforts such that threats could be identified earlier and then shared not only across the critical 
infrastructures but also between the public and private sectors. The FS-ISAC is the organization established 
to support information sharing among members of the banking and financial services industries and 
between the private-sector industry and the public sector. For more information on FS-ISAC, visit its 
website at www.fsisac.com. 7 
 
processors serving the merchant community. In order to provide a venue and structure for quickly 
and confidentially sharing information about new and emerging types of security threats and risk 
mitigation techniques, each member must sign a nondisclosure agreement
16 Following an 
organizational meeting held in conjunction with the FS-ISAC annual conference in May, 
response from the industry has been supportive; companies representing some 85 percent of the 
industry’s processed merchant transactions have joined. Since the date of this workshop, the 
PPISC has formed a Steering Committee and elected Bob Carr as its chair. It has also formed two 
working groups among its members, developed a member-only portal on the FS-ISAC website, 
and helped structure a computer-based exercise involving data threats to be held in February 
2010.Ultimately, Burns emphasized that the objective of this information-sharing initiative is to 
enable member firms to more quickly identity data security threats and to more efficiently 
respond to these threats.  
Carr raised another facet of information sharing that is challenging merchants and their 
processors and one that he feels needs further attention: the PCI auditing process. In Heartland’s 
experience, qualified security assessors (QSAs) had repeatedly rated Heartland as being PCI 
compliant
17 without detecting the existing SQL injection vulnerability. In addition, after the 
breach, Heartland was required to contract with a qualified incident response assessor (QIRA) to 
perform an independent forensic investigation of the breach to determine its source. Even though 
the method of attack had been used many times in the months preceding Heartland’s breach, Carr 
emphasized that it went unidentified during QSA audits. It also took the QIRA six weeks to 
identify the cause of Heartland’s compromise.  
                                                 
16 According to the Modern Dictionary for the Legal Profession, Third Edition, a nondisclosure agreement 
is an ―agreement restricting the use of information by prohibiting a contracting party from divulging data.‖ 
In essence, a nondisclosure agreement is a legal contract between two or more parties that defines 
information that will be shared among the parties and that may not be shared with any entity not a party to 
the contract. 
17 The PCI Security Standards Council has approved over 100 companies and 1500 employee assessors to 
validate firms as being PCI compliant.  For more information, see 
www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_qsa_list.pdf 8 
 
In both cases, Carr suggested that better data sharing — among the 100 or so companies 
approved by the networks to perform PCI compliance audits and the handful of companies 
approved by Visa
18 as response investigators — might have helped to identify the vulnerability 
before it happened and, once it did, to identify the cause of the breach more quickly, thereby 
limiting the amount of card data that the thieves were able to steal. Carr suggested that clients’ 
privacy concerns and competitive positioning by QSAs and QIRAs may be hindering information 
sharing among these firms. At the same time, he believed that these obstacles could be overcome 
by structuring information-sharing efforts in a way that ensures client anonymity and focuses 
information sharing narrowly on the attack methodologies. 
In his concluding remarks on information sharing, Carr noted several additional observations 
taken from Heartland’s data breach experience that are instructive: (1) do not underestimate the 
insider threat, (2) ensure the appropriate audit scope, and (3) maintain in-house security expertise 
at the senior executive level. Carr emphasized that insider threats may not stem from intentional 
fraud but rather from misplaced employee goodwill. For example, an employee may retain 
cached files, including account information, on their computer in order to more quickly process 
customer service requests. In addition, security protocols must be universally applied and 
enforced among all employees, at all levels of hierarchy and across all departments. Ensuring that 
auditors have a wide scope to review systems for security vulnerabilities is also important to 
identify situations, such as happened at Heartland, in which fraudsters were able to penetrate the 
processing systems by first compromising another, separate network, in this case the corporate 
network. Finally, security expertise and strategic planning are critical skills that should be 
emphasized at the highest levels of the corporate structure.  
 
                                                 
18 Visa has published more information on its data breach response process at 
www.usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp_what_to_do_if_compromised.pdf as well as a list of 
companies approved as QIRAs. See 
www.usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp_qualified_cisp_incident_response_assessors_list.pdf.  9 
 
b.  Better Secure Data, Particularly Data in Transit 
The second pillar of Heartland’s response to its data breach rested on providing leadership in 
advancing technical solutions that would better secure data in transit. Carr described three 
technologies that his company considered: end-to-end encryption, tokenization, and chip 
technology. After reviewing these solutions, Heartland’s data security team and executive 
management identified end-to-end encryption as the technology best able to address security risks 
as data move through the merchant processing chain in the authorization and capture process. 
Also, end-to-end encryption was the option that gave Heartland, as a merchant processor, the 
most direct influence.
19  
Before discussing Heartland’s view of end-to-end encryption and the steps the company has 
taken to date to move it toward a reality, a simple overview of each of these technology solutions 
follows: 
  End-to-end encryption 
The concept behind end-to-end encryption
20 is to encrypt payment card data
21 when it must 
be shared among payment network participants (data in transit) and when it must be stored in 
proprietary systems (data at rest) as part of the process to authorize, authenticate, and settle 
card transactions. Some commentators believe that encryption should begin with the plastic 
card itself (e.g., chip or smart cards). Others, including Heartland, establish the starting point 
for encryption as the card swipe at the point of sale as the magnetically stored digits (analog 
data) are converted to digital data by the magnetic stripe reader. In either case, end-to-end 
                                                 
19 Other payment processors are also offering or testing end-to-end encryption platforms, including RBS 
WorldPay and Electronic Payment Exchange. See Avivah Litan, ―Where to Begin for End-to-End 
Encryption Systems,‖ American Banker, September 15, 2009. 
20 End-to-end encryption is defined as ―the continuous protection of the confidentiality and integrity of 
transmitted information by encrypting it at the origin and decrypting it at its destination.‖ See Smart Card 
Alliance, ―End-to-End Encryption and Chip Cards in the U.S. Payment System,‖ September 2009, p. 5. 
21 Payment card data are related to information associated with the card account and the individual 
transaction. Such information may include cardholder name and address, card number and expiration date, 
and transaction details such as the dollar amount and a unique identifier.  10 
 
encryption requires that once encryption occurs, from that point forward in the processing 
chain card data should never be transmitted in clear text among the participating parties in the 
payment system.  
  Tokenization 
Tokenization is the use of randomly generated numbers or ―tokens‖ as replacements for card 
data. Generally, tokens are assigned after authorization and matches between the tokens and 
card data are maintained by third-party service providers. This process allows merchants to 
delete card data in their systems and use the assigned tokens to reference transactions. 
Moreover, after authorization and capture, the tokens may also be used to reference the 
transaction and the card data as the transaction travels through the payment system and 
during the potential dispute period that remains for several months after settlement has 
occurred. Therefore, if a merchant or its processor is hacked, thieves are unable to steal actual 
card data because they aren’t held in these systems. On the other hand, card data are still at 
risk if the third-party service provider’s systems are compromised.
22 Many times tokenization 
is combined with a form of encryption. 
  Chip technology 
Chip technology embeds a computer microchip within the traditional plastic payment card or 
in alternatives such as a contactless payment card or key fob to enable encrypted storage of 
data on the payment card, encrypted exchange of card data between the card and the 
merchant terminal, and encrypted transmission of card data among payment system 
participants.
23 To date, U.S. payment system participants have been reluctant to pursue chip 
                                                 
22 In some ways, PayPal may be seen as a provider of a form of tokenization technology because it 
facilitates transactions between merchants and consumers without requiring merchants to obtain, store, or 
process payment information.  
23 Chip or smart card solutions may take many formats, depending on the technology applied. For more 
information on these variations, see the Smart Card Alliance website at www.smartcardalliance.org. See 
also Richard Sullivan, ―Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?‖ Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Third Quarter 2008.  11 
 
technology because estimates of implementation costs, including upgrading infrastructure and 
acceptance and processing systems, are significant.
24  
In fact, each of these technologies may be applied to the market in a variety of ways and 
formats, including systems that offer a combination of these and other solutions.
25 These 
variations are also continually evolving. As a result, it is difficult to adequately estimate 
implementation costs that may fall on individual payment system participants or on the payment 
system as a whole.  
 
IV.  Heartland’s  End-to-End Encryption Solution 
Among these three technology solutions, Heartland chose to support end-to-end encryption 
for a number of reasons. Heartland executives believed they could exert the most direct influence 
over the development and implementation of this technology without requiring the cooperation of 
other payment system participants.
26 It was important to Carr that Heartland be able to control 
much of the rollout of end-to-end encryption because, in this way, Heartland could avoid 
potentially significant coordination problems. Carr also emphasized that Heartland leveraged 
third-party technology providers in order to fulfill its vision of end-to-end encryption. These 
partnerships helped Heartland quickly develop and execute its plan for better data security as well 
as minimize costs for its merchant community. As important, Heartland executives saw end-to-
end encryption as the technology best able to immediately address data-in-transit risks as data 
moved among Heartlands’ merchants, its proprietary systems, and its network partners. At the 
                                                 
24 Speer & Associates, Inc. estimated this cost to be over $10 billion in its March 29, 2008 issue of 
Strategic Commentary. See Susan Herbst-Murphy, ―Maintaining a Safe Environment for Payment Cards: 
Examining Evolving Threats Posed by Fraud,‖ Payment Cards Center, conference summary, April 2008, 
footnote 7, p. 15. (www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-
center/events/conferences/2008/PCCAprEvolvingThreatsFraud.pdf) 
25 For example, Heartland’s CIO, Steve Elefant, recently discussed combining end-to-end encryption with 
tokenization and a solution he described as dynamic data authentication. For more details, see Tom Field, 
―Heartland CIO on Improving Payments Security: Steven Elefant Discusses the Breach, End-to-End 
Encryption,‖ Bank Info Security, November 17, 2009.  
26 For more details, see the discussion of Heartland’s encryption zones (1-5) in the next paragraph. 12 
 
same time, Carr believed that end-to-end encryption also facilitated encryption of data at rest 
when held in private networks, either in merchant or processor systems.  
To further define the end-to-end encryption process envisioned by Heartland, Carr 
described five encryption zones making up the merchant processing chain. Each zone represents a 
point in payment processing at which, traditionally, data must be decrypted and re-encrypted. 
Again, Carr emphasized that Heartland’s end-to-end encryption model positioned Heartland to 
secure much of this process (zones 1-4) using its own resources; only zone 5 encryption required 
cooperation from the card brand networks. 
  Zone 1: The payment processing system at the merchant, including the payment terminal 
located at the merchant point of sale.  
  Zone 2: The transmission of card data from a merchant’s systems to its processor’s 
systems.  
  Zone 3: The internal processing that takes place within the computer systems and hardware 
security modules (HSMs) of the payment processor. 
  Zone 4: A data-at-rest function encompassing the payment processor’s internal data storage 
system. 
  Zone 5: The transfer of data from the payment processor to the card networks. 
(authorization and settlement) 
The graph below illustrates these five zones as described above by Carr. 13 
 
 
*Source: Heartland Payment Systems 
 
As Heartland’s team discussed how best to develop end-to-end encryption, they identified 
three potentially significant barriers to merchants’ investment in this technology:  cost and design 
of terminal hardware, operational burden imposed by key injection and public key management, 
and compatibility with legacy systems. Carr described each of these challenges and how 
Heartland addressed them by leveraging innovative solutions and the participation of a variety of 
technology providers.  
Heartland faced two potential obstacles when addressing initial encryption procedures at 
its merchants’ sites. The first was to design an encryption system that could be cost effectively 
incorporated into terminal hardware and the second was to support and develop merchants’ 
incentives to invest in the upgraded terminal hardware. Heartland and its terminal design partner 
leveraged security technology used at the point of sale for the entry of personal identification 
numbers (PINs). Simply, this process encrypts PINs using cryptography housed in tamper-
resistant security modules (TRMs) housed within a merchant’s POS terminal (. Then the 
encrypted PINs are transmitted to payment processors who use hardware security modules 
(HSMs) to manage the keys necessary to decrypt the PINs as part of the authorization process. In 14 
 
Heartland’s model, a similar process is employed for magnetic stripe, non-PIN cards as well as 
PIN cards. In the case of non-PIN magnetic stripe cards, the primary account number (PAN) and 
other track data
27 are encrypted when the card is swiped at the merchant terminal and remain 
encrypted as they are transmitted to the merchant’s third-party processor (zones 1 and 2). The 
data also remain encrypted while processed and stored at the third-party processor (zones 3 and 
4). Data are decrypted only after they have been received into Heartland’s HSM and when 
required by the card brands in order to enter their authorization networks. Carr emphasized that 
he has received positive feedback from the card brands regarding efforts to accept encrypted data. 
He noted that this work is continuing and, if successful, will complete the final step in the end-to-
end encryption process envisioned by Carr and his team. 
Carr acknowledged that the terminal designed by Heartland and its partner is not free for 
merchants. It costs between $300 and $500. He discussed incentives for merchants to invest in the 
upgraded terminal, ones that will influence participation levels in Heartland’s end-to-end 
encryption scheme. Foremost, Carr noted that merchants are weighing the costs of compliance 
with PCI DSS plus the investments they would have to make to institute end-to-end encryption 
against the potential relaxation of their compliance responsibilities.  
Obviously, part of this analysis will examine PCI-DSS compliance costs for merchants. 
According to a report by Mercator Advisory Group, Inc., these costs are significant and 
increasing. Average PCI compliance costs for tier 1 merchants (over 6 million transactions a 
year) in 2008 were forecast to be almost $3 million, a 127 percent increase over PCI compliance 
spending in 2006. Costs for tier 2 merchants (between 150,000 and 6 million transactions a year) 
in 2008 were estimated to be almost $1.5 million, a 97 percent increase over 2006 costs. Finally, 
2008 costs for tier 3 merchants (fewer than 150,000 transactions) were projected to be about $.17 
                                                 
27 Track data include the card number, the card’s expiration data, the cardholder’s name and address, and a 
service code, along with discretionary information that may represent the PIN verification value or card 
verification value (a three- or four-digit code printed on the back of the payment card). 15 
 
million, a 16 percent increase over 2006 levels.
28 While PCI compliance requirements for smaller 
merchants (tier 3) are less burdensome, the average cost per transaction in 2008 was likely more 
than four times greater than those costs for tier 2 merchants.
29  
To the extent that end-to-end encryption is able to reduce the scope of PCI audits and the 
associated compliance burdens on merchants, Carr stated that the resulting cost savings can 
justify investing in the terminal hardware that enables this technology.
30 Any compliance savings 
would require that card brands and the PCI Security Standards Council support end-to-end 
encryption as a mechanism to reduce risk at participating merchants and third-party processors.  
There is some evidence that both constituencies
31 are studying the protections afforded not only 
by end-to-end encryption but also by other emerging technologies, including tokenization and 
chip technology. For example, the PCI Security Standards Council contracted with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to ―evaluate which technologies have the potential to facilitate 
compliance and reduce risk associated with payment card data.‖
32   
In Carr’s experience, merchants are also very conscious of the potential reputational risk 
and cost exposure that may arise because of a data breach. Merchants do not want their customers 
                                                 
28 George Peabody, ―End to End Encryption: The Acquiring Side Responds to Data Loss and PCI 
Compliance,‖ Mercator Advisory Group, June 2009, p. 9. 
29 This estimate was derived by dividing the average 2008 PCI compliance cost by the ceiling number of 
transactions, for both the tier 2 and tier 3 merchant categories. For example, the average 2008 PCI 
compliance cost for tier 2 merchants was $1,450,000 and the tier is bounded by merchants with 6 million 
transactions. The PCI compliance cost per transaction was calculated by dividing $1,450,000 by 6,000,000, 
equaling $0.24 per transaction. The same method was used to calculate the per transaction cost for tier 3 
merchants: dividing $168,600 by 150,000 transactions, which equals $1.12 per transaction.  
30 The PCI Security Standards Council announced that it has begun the process to review stakeholder 
feedback as part of developing the next iteration of the PCI DSS. One area being considered as part of the 
update to PCI DSS is ―examining the impact of technologies like tokenization, end-to-end encryption, chip 
technology, and virtual terminals on PCI standards.‖ See PCI Security Standards Council, ―PCI Security 
Standards Council Enters Next Phase of Data Security Standards Development,‖ press release, November 
16, 2009. 
31 Ellen Richey of Visa, Inc. stated that ―we are working on an approach that would allow merchants to 
satisfy some of our compliance requirements through the application of chip or encryption tools.‖ See 
Avivah Litan, ―Where to Begin for End-to-End Encryption Systems,‖ American Banker, September 15, 
2009. 
32 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ―PCI Standard Evolves to Address Continued Security Threats,‖ Quickbrief, 
August 31, 2009. 16 
 
to choose to do business with a competitor because of perceptions about data security, nor do 
merchants want to be subject to card brand fines or issuer recovery costs associated with, for 
example, card reissuance. To the extent that merchants can reduce or eliminate their exposure by 
storing less card data or better encrypting card data, Carr believes that there are real incentives for 
merchants to do so.  
The next potential barrier identified by Carr dealt with the operational and cost burden 
placed on merchants due to the key injection and management process. In the past, each PIN 
point-of-sale terminal required a unique key to identify the terminal. Keys have a limited shelf 
life due to fraud controls, changes in processors, or potential compromises, requiring new keys to 
be ―injected‖ into terminals. In most cases, key injection requires that terminals be swapped out 
while their keys are changed. Depending on the number of terminals a merchant maintains, this 
can be a costly and cumbersome proposition.
33 When expanding the PIN security infrastructure to 
all magnetic stripe cards, Heartland recognized that broadening key management responsibilities 
for merchants may act as a barrier to adoption of end-to-end encryption.  
To address this problem, Heartland partnered with Voltage Security, a company that 
offers identity-based encryption (IBE). Among other things, identity-based encryption does not 
require key injection after the public key is injected during the manufacturing process. As a 
result, merchants participating in Heartland’s end-to-end encryption need not swap out terminals 
in order for key injection to occur because IBE provides an alternative solution. 
Finally, the Voltage Security product also preserves format, which means that legacy 
systems designed to store primary account numbers do not need to be modified to accommodate a 
larger number of bytes, as has been traditionally required when encrypting card data. Therefore, 
the format-preserving platform limits system modifications and associated costs that might have 
been necessary if merchants were required to modify platforms to accommodate a larger field. 
                                                 
33 Stuart Taylor, ―Go Remote: Boost Security and Profits,‖ The Green Sheet 2.0, Issue 09:04:02, April 27, 
2009. (www.greensheet.com/emagazine.php?issue_number=090402&story_id=1313) 17 
 
By designing its end-to-end encryption platform in this way, Heartland was able to address 
many merchant concerns about hardware replacement costs and increased operational costs. A 
remaining concern for Carr and others centers on the development of standards for end-to-end 
encryption technology and its process.
 34 Carr noted that his company is working with the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to begin development on standards but 
acknowledged that this is typically a long process. In the meantime, Heartland is making its end-
to-end encryption process public, including sharing details of its solution with competitors and its 
terminal specifications with other terminal vendors. Carr hopes that by doing so, Heartland will 
be able to (1) build adoption and support for standards consistent with its end-to-end encryption 
model and (2) address one last merchant concern – increased switching costs – by making the 
Heartland end-to-end encryption process a common offering in the merchant processing 
community. 
V.  Conclusion 
Carr acknowledged that Heartland is working within the confines of the merchant acquiring 
and processing environment to address data security both through improved information sharing 
and security of data in transit. He recognized that end-to-end encryption is not a solution that 
makes sense in mitigating some types of fraud faced primarily on the card-issuing side of 
payment networks, such as application fraud and new account identity theft.
35 At the same time, 
he believes that it is important to contribute to better data security measures in meaningful ways 
and in areas where his company can have a direct influence on the development of enhancements 
to the payment system.  
                                                 
34 Visa released a best practices document addressing data field encryption, otherwise known as end-to-end 
encryption, to ―assist merchants in evaluating the new encryption solutions emerging in the marketplace.‖ 
See Visa Best Practices, ―Data Field Encryption Version 1.0,‖ October 5, 2009. 
(www.corporate.visa.com/_media/best-practices.pdf) 
35 Carr also stated that end-to-end encryption doesn’t address counterfeit card fraud. 18 
 
In addition, Burns suggested that because data security and fraud mitigation priorities may 
differ depending on the role a participant plays in the consumer payment card networks, the 
prospect of larger coordination and incentive problems are raised. And while Heartland chose to 
address data security on a specific side of payment networks – the acquiring side – and has aimed 
to do so in such a way that it can exert some control over the process, this choice does not mean 
that Heartland undervalues the contribution made when all payment system participants engage in 
discussions of how to better secure payment and consumer data.  
For example, Burns and Carr observed that card brands are uniquely positioned to influence 
merchant incentives to adopt technology solutions and to address competitive issues arising in 
efforts to improve data sharing.  Among the levers card brands may use to encourage technology 
adoption among merchants include facilitating the development of standards, reducing 
interchange costs or data security fines for participating merchants, or subsidizing hardware 
purchases for those merchants interested in pursuing an end-to-end encryption or similar risk-
reduction strategy. Card brands may also be best situated to encourage information sharing, 
especially among QSAs and QIRAs, as a way to leverage merchant and processor fraud 
experiences to limit future exposure and, potentially, subsequent losses. Each of these efforts 
alone or in conjunction may help boost merchants’ confidence that their investment in emerging 
data protection technologies will garner returns in the form of cost savings.   
In the end, the data breach at Heartland was very costly for the company: Immediately 
following the breach, it lost 50 percent of its market capitalization and, as of August 2009, had 
spent more than $32 million on legal fees, forensic costs, reserves for potential card brand fines, 
and other related settlement costs. Carr emphasized that others in the payments chain also face 
losses when data breaches occur. Most important, if the breach is significant enough or if there 
are a number of breaches over a short period of time, consumer confidence in card-based 
electronic payments may suffer, causing consumers to switch to less efficient forms of payments. 
If this were to happen and card transaction volumes declined, card brands and issuing banks will 19 
 
also face contractions in their business. In responding to breaches, issuing banks might face costs 
due to card reissuance, fraud losses, or customer attrition as a result of the event. For these 
reasons, Carr emphasized that all participants in card payment networks have many incentives to 
reduce risks associated with data breaches and, indeed, these firms are finding more ways to 
coordinate their efforts in doing so. 
 
 